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The Concept of Legalization

Ummul Waraah
Assistant Professor,
Department of Law, Presidency University, Bangalore, India,
Email Id-ummulwaraah@presidencyuniversity.in

There is a component of political ability that the management school seldom considers and that is unlikely to be exorcised by technological aid. It is, nevertheless, inextricably linked to the creation of both local political institutions and foreign regimes. One conceivable option is to limit regime membership to nations that will not have to defect often. The theory is that whatever value is lost by excluding such governments from the regime will be more than offset by allowing those who are included to establish and enforce a greater degree of cooperation in this example, a higher norm of free trade. This might explain why, in contrast to the large-n coordination concerns of collective action theory, many very cooperative regimes have a small number of members whereas regimes with a large number of members tend to engage in only superficial cooperation. Is this a true trade-off? Must states occasionally choose between actively resolving an environmental or trade issue and attempting to form a community of states? We don't know. What we do know is that ignoring the problem based on high compliance rates and a lack of enforcement is terribly imprudent[1]–[3].

Each of these aspects is a question of degree and gradation, not a hard and fast dichotomy, and each may fluctuate separately. As a result, the concept of legalisation encompasses a multidimensional continuum ranging from the ideal type of legalisation, where all three properties are maximized; to hard legalisation, where all three or at least obligation and delegation are high; through multiple forms of partial or soft legalisation involving different combinations of attributes; and finally, to the complete absence of legalisation, another ideal type. None of these elements, much alone the whole range of legalisation, can be completely operationalized. We do, however, explore a variety of strategies by which players alter legalisation aspects in the section headed The Dimensions of Legalization.

By moving away from a restricted understanding of law as needing enforcement by a coercive sovereign, we establish common ground for political scientists and lawyers. This criterion has served as the foundation for most international relations thought on the subject. Since nearly no international organisation meets this requirement, there is widespread disrespect for the significance of international law. Yet, theoretical work in international relations has moved focus away from the requirement for centralized enforcement and towards more institutionalized means of encouraging cooperation. Moreover, the kinds of legality we see at the millennium's turn are thriving in the absence of centralized compulsion[4], [5]. Structure, one may map where a certain arrangement sits on the three dimensions of legality. For example, the World Trade Organization's WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Ip Rights TRIPs is strong on all three areas. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Under Sea, signed in 1963, is legally obligatory and exact, although it delegated practically little legal power. Yet, although relatively specific, the 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and CoOperation was expressly not legally enforceable and conferred minimal power.

This ruling demands a more extensive definition of the kinds of obligation, precision, and delegation employed in each instance than those in row V. In certain circumstances, a strong legal duty such as the original Vienna Ozone Convention, row V may be more legalised than a lesser commitment such as Agenda 21, row IV, even if the latter was more detailed and required more delegation. Additionally, at lower levels, the relative importance of delegation in relation to other aspects becomes less evident,

since really high delegation, including judicial or quasi-judicial power, virtually never coexists with low levels of legal responsibility. Delegation in rows IV and VI is often administrative or operational in character[6], [7].

Thus, a precise but non-obligatory agreement such as the Helsinki Final Act, row VII might be considered more highly legalized than an imprecise and non-obligatory agreement accompanied by modest administrative delegation such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, row VI. The main argument should be interpreted figuratively rather than literallyrows indicate a broad variety of soft or intermediate kinds of legalisation. Norms may exist in this area, but they are difficult to apply as law in a strict sense. The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer row V, for example, imposed obligatory treaty duties, but the majority of its substantive commitments were articulated in broad, even hortatory language and were not linked to an institutional structure with independent power. Agenda 21, issued at the Rio Environment and Development Conference in 1992 row IV, specifies out highly complex rules on a variety of subjects, although it was obviously meant not to be legally enforceable and is implemented by relatively weak UN agencies. These types of arrangements are often utilised in situations when standards are challenged and concerns about sovereign sovereignty are prominent, making greater degrees of responsibility, accuracy, or delegation problematic.

Balances of power and spheres of influence are two examples of rule systems with extremely low degrees of legality in row VIII. In any practical sense, they are not legal institutions. The balance of power was marked by practical rules6 and diplomatic agreements, like as the Concert of Europe. During the Cold War, spheres of influence were unclear, duties were partially specified in treaties but primarily unspoken, and there was no institutional structure to manage them.Ultimately, at the bottom of the table, we arrive at the ideal sort of anarchy that is prevalent in the field of international relations. Anarchy is a frequently misinterpreted word of art, since even severe forms of international anarchy are organised by laws, most notably norms establishing state sovereignty, with legal or pre-legal qualities.Hedley Bull defines an anarchical society as one defined by institutions such as sovereignty and international law, as well as diplomacy and the balance of power. Therefore, there is a vast conceptual gap between the weakest kinds of legality and the utter lack of norms and institutions.

Obligation

Legislative laws and commitments place nations and other subjects under a certain form of binding duty such as international organizations. Legal responsibilities vary from obligations coming only from force, comity, or morality. As previously noted, legal duties put into play the international legal system's established norms, processes, and modes of discourse.Pacta sunt servanda is a key international law concept that states that the norms and pledges included in codified international agreements are considered obligatory, subject to different defences or exceptions, and are not to be discarded when preferences change. They must be carried out in good faith, regardless of any inconsistencies in domestic legislation. International law also includes principles for interpreting agreements as well as a number of technical regulations on topics like as creation, reservation, and revisions. Violation of a legal duty is regarded to produce legal responsibility, which does not need particular governmental agencies to demonstrate intent.6

Commitments may vary greatly over the responsibility continuum, as seen in Table of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, in its full, states: The archives and records of the mission must be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be. Overall, this convention illustrates the parties' determination to establish legally enforceable commitments controlled by international law. It employs the language of obligation, requires the traditional legal requirements of signature, ratification, and entry into force, requires the agreement and national ratification documents to be registered with the UN, is referred to as a Convention, and states its relationship to preexisting rules of customary international law. In formal, even legalistic, words, Article 24 imposes an unqualified duty.The Last Act of Helsinki. The parties indicated that this agreement was not a arrangement... regulated by international law by declaring that it could not be registered with the UN. Some instruments are much more explicit

take, for example, the 1992 Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Declaration of Principles for a Global Consensus on forest sustainability management.Several national government working agreements are specifically non-binding. Instruments labelled as recommendations or guidelines, such as the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Companies, are often not designed to generate legally enforceable requirements.

Over time, even nonbinding pronouncements may alter governments' and other actors' behaviours and expectations of proper behaviour, leading to the establishment of customary law or the implementation of more binding agreements. Soft pledges may also be used to invoke the legal concept of good faith compliance, lessening challenges to future changes. The legal implications of soft tools are extensively debated in numerous topic areas. Advocates argue for instantaneous and universal legal impact under both old doctrines such as a document codifying existing customary law or interpreting an organisational charter and novel doctrines such as an instrument reflecting an international consensus or instant custom. Soft normative tools, like deeds of international governance, have a delicately woven ambiguity.

Many significant directions are expressed as relatively broad standards do not drive recklessly in highly developed legal systems, while many are formulated as relatively exact rules do not drive faster than 50 miles per hour. 16 The more rule-like a normative prescription, the more a society chooses which types of conduct are undesirable in advance; such judgements are often made by legislative bodies. The more standard-like a prescription, the more a community determines this ex-post, in respect to particular sets of circumstances; such choices are often assigned to courts. Standards enable courts to consider equitable elements relevant to specific individuals or circumstances, although at the expense of some ex-ante clarity. 17 Domestic legal systems can employ standards such as due care or the Sherman Act's prohibition on conspiracies in restraint of trade because they have well-established courts and agencies capable of interpreting and applying them high delegation, resulting in increasingly precise bodies of precedent.

many treaty obligations are imprecise and generic in the following respects. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement side agreement on labour mandates the parties to provide for strong labour standards. Commercial treaties often oblige nations to establish favorable circumstances for investment and to refrain from enacting unreasonable restrictions. Many treaties require governments to negotiate or consult, but do not identify specific methods. All of these clauses provide impacted actors a lot of leeway; in fact, several of them are so wide that it's impossible to measure compliance, casting doubt on their legal authority. 19 According to Abbott and Snidal's article20, such imprecision is not usually the consequence of a lack of legal draughtsman ship, but rather a purposeful decision given the realities of local and international politics.

The third component of legalisation is the degree to which governments and other actors transfer power to authorized third parties to execute agreements, such as courts, arbitrators, and administrative bodies. The most common types of legal delegation are third-party conflict resolution procedures permitted by established doctrines of international law to interpret rules and apply them to specific circumstances and so, in effect, to invent new rules, at least interstitially. Dispute resolution mechanisms are most legalized when the parties agree to binding third-party decisions based on clear and broadly applicable rules; they are least legalized when the process involves political bargaining between parties who can accept or reject proposals without legal justification. dispute-resolution processes vary from no delegation as in traditional political decision making through formalized forms of negotiation, including measures to assist agreement, such as mediation available via the WTO and conciliation one option under the Law of the Sea Convention; unenforceable arbitration basically the old GATT process; binding arbitration as in the US-Iran Claims Tribunal; and eventually real judgement.

delegate often relies on how far these norms are perceived to be capable of restricting the delegated power. Delegation to third-party adjudicators will almost certainly be followed by the implementation of adjudication guidelines. When it sorts out conflicts between rules or analyses the integrity of rules that are the subject of dispute, the adjudicative body may find it essential to identify or construct rules

of recognition and modification.Transfer of legal jurisdiction extends beyond dispute settlement. A variety of institutions ranging from modest consultative arrangements to full-fledged international bureaucracies contribute to the development of vague legal standards, the implementation of agreed rules, and the facilitation of enforcement.

Delegated legal power has its own interests, which may be more or less effectively restrained by constraints on authority grant and concurrent supervision by member nations. Transnational coalitions of nonstate entities also pursue their interests at the supranational level via persuasion or direct engagement, generally with greater divergence from member state concerns. Dispute resolution, adaptation or development of new rules, implementation of established norms, and response to rule infractions all generate their own sort of politics, which aids in the restructuring of conventional interstate politics.Highly legalised institutions are those in which rules are binding on parties via links to established rules and principles of international law, rules are precise or can be made precise through the exercise of delegated authority, and authority to interpret and apply the rules has been delegated to third party companies acting under the constraint of rules. Yet, there is no clear distinction between licenced and unlegalized institutions. Instead, there is a discernible continuum extending from hard law through several types of legal frameworks, each with its own unique set of features, to instances of minor legality.

This continuum assumes that authorised institutions vary from other kinds of international institutions in some way, a distinction that may have methodological, procedural, cultural, and informational characteristics. While mediators may be allowed to broker a deal based on the parties' naked preferences,24 judicial procedures entail a discourse structured in terms of reason, understanding, technical expertise, and debate, which is often followed by discussion and judgement by neutral parties. Various players have access to the process, and they are compelled to argue in ways that they would not in a nonlegal situation. Legal judgements must also be founded on considerations that apply to all similarly situated litigants, not only the parties to the current dispute.There is significant difficulty in determining the direct impact of legalisation. Apart than their legal existence, regulations are followed for a variety of reasons. Concerns about reciprocity, respect, and harm to important state institutions, among other moral and material factors, all play a role. Nonetheless, it is logical to believe that most of the time, legal and political factors combine to impact conduct.

At one extreme, even pure political bargaining is influenced by sovereignty laws and other legal standards. At the other end of the spectrum, even international adjudication occurs in the shadow of politics: interested parties help shape the agenda and initiate proceedings; judges are typically aware of the political implications of potential decisions, attempting to anticipate a reaction of political authorities. Actors mix and invoke varied degrees of responsibility, precision, and delegation to construct nuanced blends of politics and law between these extremes, where most international legalisation occurs. To quote Clausewitz, law is a continuation of political interaction, with the addition of additional methods in all of these contexts.

Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational

Access to courts and tribunals, and the subsequent implementation of their judgements, are legally shielded from the will of individual national governments in transnational conflict resolution. As a result, these courts are more accessible to people and organisations from civil society. States lose their gatekeeping powers in the pure ideal type; in fact, these capacities are weakened. This loss of governmental power, whether willingly or inadvertently ceded, opens up a slew of chances for courts and their constituents to set the agenda.It is useful to situate our study within a larger perspective. Legalization is a kind of institutionalization that is defined by duty, specificity, and delegation. Our analysis is most useful when the obligation is high. 3 Precision, on the other hand, is not a distinguishing feature of the cases under consideration. We investigate the choices of bodies that interpret and implement regulations, regardless of how precise they are. Indeed, when accuracy is low, such bodies may have more latitude than when precision is high. 4 Our attention is on a third

component of legalisation: delegation of power to courts and tribunals tasked with resolving international conflicts using basic legal principles.

We attempt to integrate international politics, international law, and domestic politics in the second half. Obviously, state power and preferences impact both government and conflict resolution tribunal behaviour: international law functions in the shadow of power.Yet, we suggest that within that political framework, institutions for choosing judges, restricting access to conflict resolution, and legally implementing the decisions of global tribunals and courts have a significant influence on state conduct. Other than national governments, the formal characteristics of legal institutions strengthen or weaken domestic political players.

Transnational conflict resolution generates more litigation, jurisprudence independent of national interests, and an extra source of pressure for compliance as compared to interstate dispute settlement. We argue in the third part that interstate and international conflict settlement have differing long-term patterns. International dispute resolution seems to have a more expansive nature by definition; it affords more opportunity to assert and create new legal standards, sometimes in unanticipated ways.Most of the resolving of disputes in international politics is highly institutionalised. Established, permanent norms apply to whole classes of events and cannot be readily disregarded or amended when one player or another in a given instance finds them inconvenient. This article focuses on institutions where dispute resolution is entrusted to a third-party tribunal tasked with implementing certain legal norms and principles. An act of delegation requires that conflicts be presented as cases between two or more parties, with at least one of them, the defendant, being a state or a person acting on behalf of a state.

International tribunals, such as the planned International Criminal Court and different war crimes tribunals, may try war criminals. The identity of the plaintiff is determined by the dispute resolution mechanism's design.Plaintiffs might be other nations or private parties people or nongovernmental organisations NGOs who have been specially authorised to monitor and enforce the regime's mandatory norms.Now we'll look at our three-response variable: independence, access, and embedding. We do not dispute that the patterns of delegation we see have their roots in the authority and interests of powerful nations, as some liberal and realist theories imply. Yet, our research here takes these delegation sources for granted and focuses on how formal legal structures empower organisations and persons other than national governments.

Independence: Who Controls Adjudication

The variable independence assesses the ability of adjudicators for an international body entrusted with dispute resolution to consider and make legal decisions independently of nation states. In other words, it analyses the degree to which adjudication is performed impartially in relation to particular state interests in a given case. The conventional international paradigm of conflict settlement in law and politics positions complete state power at one end of a spectrum. Conflicts are settled by the agents of the parties involved. Each party gives its own interpretation of the rules and their application to the particular situation at hand; differences are settled via institutionalized interstate negotiation. There are no permanent procedural standards or legal precedents, yet outcomes in legalized conflict settlement must be compatible with international law. Institutional norms may also have an impact on the result by setting the circumstances interpretative criteria, voting requirements, and selection under which authoritative judgements are made.

The standards for selection and tenure differ greatly. Via selection and tenure restrictions, many international organisations retain strict national control over dispute settlement. Certain organisations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, NATO, and the bilateral Soviet-US arrangements created by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT, have no official third-party adjudicators at all. Instead, the system establishes a set of decision-making norms and processes, as well as a platform for interstate negotiation, within which future disagreements are addressed by national representatives appointed by respective governments. Governments may appoint representatives to other organisations, such as the EU, but such representatives are guaranteed lengthy tenure and may

enjoy subsequent respect in the legal world independent of their service to specific nations. Groups of states select a stable of experts who are then selected on a case-by-case basis by the parties and the secretariat in first-round dispute resolution in GATT and the World Trade Organization WTO, whereas in ad hoc international arbitration, the selection is generally governed by the disputants and the tribunal is constituted for a single case.

The second requirement for judicial independence is legal discretion, which relates to the scope of the conflict settlement body's mission.Certain authorised conflict resolution agencies must strictly comply to treaty terms; yet, as Karen Alter11 notes, the European Court of Justice ECJ has established the supremacy of European Economic EC law without express foundation in the treaty language or the desire of national governments. More broadly, as Abbott and Snidal12 suggest, institutions for adjudication emerge under contexts of complexity and ambiguity, which make interstate contracts inherently imperfect. Adjudication is therefore more than just applying certain rules and norms to a series of real situations under a specific mandate; it also entails interpreting norms and resolving conflicts between conflicting norms in the context of specific cases. Litigants and courts must unavoidably resort to specific interpretations of such ambiguities when trying to invalidate any but the most flagrantly unconstitutional governmental activities. All things being equal, the higher the body's potential legal independence, the larger the range of elements it may lawfully evaluate and the greater the ambiguity about the right interpretation or standard in a specific situation.

The third criteria for judicial independence, financial and human resources, relates to judges' abilities to handle their caseloads in a timely and efficient manner. 13 Such resources are required for handling a huge number of complaints and making consistent, high-quality choices. They may also allow a court or tribunal to create a factual record independent of the state litigants before them and make their judgements public. This is especially important for human rights courts, which attempt to disseminate information and generate political support on behalf of persons who might otherwise lack direct access to effective political representation on a domestic level. Several human rights tribunals are affiliated to commissions that may undertake independent investigations. The Inter-American and UN commissions, for example, have been active in following this policy, often conducting independent, on-site investigations. 15 Moreover, the Inter-American Commission's inquiry do not have to be limited to the specifics of a given case, however a previous petition is necessary. In general, the more financial and human resources available to courts, as well as the more powerful the commissions affiliated to them, the greater their legal independence.

Access

Access, like independence, is subject to change. Access defines the range of social and political players who have legal standing to submit a dispute for resolution; from a political standpoint, access measures the range of individuals who can determine the agenda. Access is especially crucial with regard to courts and other dispute resolution agencies since, unlike presidents and legislators, they are passive government instruments incapable of initiating action by unilaterally seizing a dispute. Access is assessed on a scale between two extremes. At one extreme, if no social or political actors may submit grievances, conflict resolution organisations cannot act; at the other, anybody with a real grievance against government policy can simply and quickly file a complaint.Submit a complaint at a low cost. In the meantime, people may only lodge their grievances via governments, persuade governments to espouse their claim as a state claim against another agency, or engage in an expensive process. This access continuum may be thought of as a measure of the political transaction costs to people and organisations in society of bringing a complaint to an international dispute resolution body. The more stringent the requirements for bringing a claim before a dispute resolution authority, the more expensive it is for actors to do so.

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On the more expensive and restricted end of the spectrum, as represented in , are solely interstate courts such as GATT and WTO panels, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the ICJ, where only member states may bring suit against one another. While this restriction limits access to any conflict resolution organisation by allowing one or more states a formal veto, it does not allow governments to act freely. People and organisations may still wield power, but only via domestic methods. Processes that are nominally comparable in this sense may have quite diverse access consequences depending on principal-agent relationships in domestic politics.Individuals and organisations may have the domestic policy power to play a continuing, though indirect, part in both the choice to commence proceedings and the following debate, but state-controlled institutions are likely to be more limited than direct litigation by people and groups.

Given these limits, GATT/WTO panels and the ICJ play different roles in dealing with domestic persons and organisations. Governments theoretically restrict access to the judicial process under the GATT and now the WTO, but in practise, damaged industries are directly engaged in both the start and conduct of lawsuits by their governments, at least in the United States. Individual admission to the ICJ, on the other hand, is more expensive. The International Court of Justice handles matters in which persons have a direct interest for example, families of soldiers ordered to fight in another country in what is arguably an unlawful act of interstate hostility. These persons, however, often have little influence over a national government's choice to commence interstate litigation or the subsequent conduct of the proceedings. Individuals, as in the WTO, are unable to sue their own government in the ICJ.

The choice to bring the matter before it is still in the hands of a domestic court. National courts may independently submit a dispute before them to the ECJ under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome if the case presents concerns of European law that the national court does not feel able to handle on its own. The ECJ responds to the precise questions raised and remands the matter to the national court for resolution of the merits of the issue. Litigants may propose such a referral to the national court, but the authority to refer ultimately rests with the national court. The expense of obtaining such a referral is the same whether the interests affected are small and preciseas in the classic Cassis de Burgundy case over the importation of French speciality liquors into Germanyor wide. As Karen Alterdemonstrates in her article,16 various national courts have wildly disparate referral histories, but as a group, national courts have been more ready to send cases to the ECJ. These referrals may entail private-party lawsuits rather than solely against a state institution.

Implementation and compliance in international conflicts are significantly more difficult than in well-functioning domestic rule-of-law regimes. The political relevance of delegating responsibility over dispute settlement therefore relies in part on the degree of influence that particular governments have over legislation promulgation and judgement implementation. Formal legal frameworks influence state power along a spectrum we call embeddedness.Most international legal systems are similar to the WTO system in that governments are required by international law to comply with the decisions of international courts or tribunals, but no local legal mechanism ensures legal execution. If national presidents and legislatures fail to act due to internal political opposition or inertia, governments simply acquire an additional international legal duty to rectify the harm. In other words, if an international tribunal decides that state A unlawfully participated in state B's domestic affairs and requires state A to pay damages, but state A's legislature refuses to provide the money, state B has no alternative under international law other than to seek higher damages. Alternatively, if state A signs a treaty requiring it to change its national legislation to reduce the level of certain pollutants it emits, and the executive branch fails to pass legislation to do so, state A is liable to its treaty partners under international law, but cannot be compelled to take the action agreed to in the treaty.

At the opposite extreme of the scale, where individual governments' power is most restrained by the embeddedness and international standards, are systems in which independent national courts may

impose international decisions on their own governments. The European Union's judicial system is the most visible example of this style of enforcement. Domestic courts in each member state accept that EC law is superior to national law supremacy and that it confers rights on which persons may litigate direct effect. When the ECJ sends advisory opinions to national courts through the Article 177 process, as detailed in Karen Alter's article18, national courts prefer to obey them, even when they contradict precedent established by higher national courts. These rules are not directly mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, but the ECJ has successfully constitutionalized them during the last four decades. 19 The European Free Trade Association EFTA court system, formed in 1994, also allows such referrals, albeit, unlike the Treaty of Rome, it neither legally obligates domestic courts to refer nor requires them to do so.

When these three dimensions are combined, two perfect kinds result. Individual national governments may veto adjudicators, agendas, and enforcement in one ideal kind interstate conflict resolution. Each governments choose who judges, what they judge, and how the judgement is carried out. Adjudicators, agenda, and enforcement, on the other hand, are mostly independent of individual and collective pressure from national governments. This ideal kind is known as international conflict resolution. Under this institutional setup, which the EU and the ECHR are prime instances of, judges are shielded from national governments, society persons and groups set the agenda, and the outcomes are executed by an independent national court. The rest of this article discusses the significance of variance throughout the spectrum of interstate to transnational conflict resolution for the character, compliance with, and development of international law[1], [8], [9].

Calling a process legalised does not render politics obsolete. Choices concerning a tribunal's power and access to it are political battlegrounds in and of themselves. The most heated debates are likely to occur ex ante during the negotiating over the creation of a tribunal; nevertheless, additional possibilities for political involvement may arise throughout the existence of a tribunal, perhaps as a consequence of its own constitutional requirements. Nonetheless, appearance is important. Litigation and compliance politics are substantially different in global dispute resolution than in interstate dispute settlement. In this part, we explain these disparities and provide some preliminary hypotheses tying our three explanatory factors to conflict resolution politics.

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